













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEAo
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2130-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2130-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C























LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C 3 C ] C ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [





















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C





















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2043








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RLR42 TYPE RESISTORS HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO RWR80 TYPE RESISTORS,
WHICH CAN SHORT. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA. NOTE: THE OPEN FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA IS ON
05-6KA-2111-I.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2111-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2044
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEAo
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2055
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2056
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2061
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2062
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)



























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2093-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2073
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2074
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] -[ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C 3 [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2093-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C 3 [ ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/nmC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RLR42 TYPE RESISTORS HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO RWR80 TYPE RESISTORS,
WHICH CAN SHORT. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA. NOTE: THE OPEN FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA IS ON.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BEREMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2111-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2096
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .




ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2 I02
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] .[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2106
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .




ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2 i08
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CO_PARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA _[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2115
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2116
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:








ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2117 .
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2093-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2093-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2127
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2128
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ .3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2097-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2098-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
-(ADD/DELETE)























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2096-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, I. 8K I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2109-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2109-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE

















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
ix]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIB LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE


















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE


















RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2158
RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2159
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE


















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE
















RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE


















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N 1 [ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
sEE


















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[_ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA C / ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE
















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE


















RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12261X-12265X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] CP] P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE

















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE
















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE


















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE


















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE"


















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12256X-12260X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] CP] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE

















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2183
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2187
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDWlFUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ _]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2191
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA La/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE

























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]&a2232H_ ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] C N ] C N ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE
















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12271X-12275X.
SEE














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE




















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE





















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE





















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE





















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12266X-12270X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE

















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











C / ] C
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
R_:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DP





















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE •













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2216
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVERSWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE
















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE












NASA [ / ] [







RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2223
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12281X-12285X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
-(ADD/DELETE )




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE

















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZEDBY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE
















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12276X-12280X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE




















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE












NASA [ / ]







RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / i c J J c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDe ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE
















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC2376HA B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE













NASA [ I ]
IOA [ 3 12R ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE




























[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE
















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2247
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ 3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2251
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [. ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12291X-12295X.
SEE














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE




















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X°
SEE





















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / l [ i E i [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE





















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA°
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12286X-12290X.
SEE














RJDAIB MANIFOLD LI/RI/L5 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A & B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A & B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.














RJDA2BMANIFOLD L3/R3/R5 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE C N /N ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A & B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.














RJDA2A MANIFOLD L4/R4 TRICKLE TEST




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE THREE RJDF TRICKLE TESTS IMPLEMENT A SOFTWARE ROUTINE TO
VERIFY LOGIC OUTPUTS FROM VARYING A & B PULSE COMMAND INPUTS.
ASSOCIATED FAILURES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE HARDWARE/EPD&C
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LIGHTS ACTIVATE WHEN DAP PITCH, YAW, AND ROLL COMMANDS ARE
INITIATED. THIS FAILURE IS UNDER DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR









[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:











NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] CP] [P]
C ] [ ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE C /N ] C N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR









[3/2R] [P] [P] [P3
[3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR










[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX MANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA •[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















L/R OX MANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX MANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA # : 03-2A-203365-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX MANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]. [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221314-I
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221314-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221314-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] C P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. (IOA FAILURE SAME AS ARCS-2280).
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221314-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2283
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R









NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[P] [p]
C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :















ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] "[ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. (IOA FAILURE SAME AS ARCS-2283).
[ ]
[ ]















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT MAY FAIL JETS. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION
OPERATIONS. NOTE: EXISTING NASA FMEA LISTED CONTAINS ONLY
PRIMARY CHAMBERPRESSURE SENSORS. IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF
VERNIER CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR WAS
PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT MAY FAIL JETS. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION
OPERATIONS. NOTE: EXISTING NASA FMEA LISTED CONTAINS ONLY
PRIMARY CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS. IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF
VERNIER CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR WAS
PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT MAY FAIL JETS. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION
OPERATIONS. NOTE: EXISTING NASA FMEA LISTED CONTAINS ONLY
PRIMARY CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS. IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF
VERNIER CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR WAS
PART OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.











ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
IEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ ] [ ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221314-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2290
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221314-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2291
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. (IOA FAILURE SAME AS ARCS-2289).
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221315-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA,












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221315-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221315-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2294
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS
LIL, L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221315-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2295
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS
LIL, L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS
L5L, L5D, R5R, R5D




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT MAY FAIL JETS. THIS MAY EFFECT MISSION
OPERATIONS. NOTE: EXISTING NASA FMEA CONTAINS ONLY THE PRIMARY
TEMPERATURE SENSORS. IOA RECOMMENDS THE INCLUSION OF VERNIER
SENSOR INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS WERE PART
OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.











ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS
L5L, L5D, R5R, R5D




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT MAY FAIL JETS. THIS MAY EFFECT MISSION
OPERATIONS. NOTE: EXISTING NASA FMEA CONTAINS ONLY THE PRIMARY
TEMPERATURE SENSORS. IOA RECOMMENDS THE INCLUSION OF VERNIER
SENSOR INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS WERE PART
OF THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221315-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2298
ITEM: L/ OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS
LIU, L2U, L4U, L2D,_L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D












[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221315-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2299
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS
LIU, L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2216-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2216-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
RY__"






















[2/2 ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2216-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 13 ]
IOA [ 3 IIR]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ I N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2216-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/IR3 [P]




CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2216-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















[ 3/3 ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2222-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]























[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: NASA FMEA PART NUMBER LISTED
AS 36V73AI4F31 SHOULD BE 36V73AI4F30.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUSE INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED BY IOA. SEE ARCS-2314.
[ ]
[ ]














HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221316-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:


















HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
:OMPARE [ /N ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
:OMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
2320
















_ECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
2321
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221317-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] CN] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221317-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A _ TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FME.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLEFAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
2334
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOARECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.














THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] C P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO EFFECT. IOARECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE
INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o188.














THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.














THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO EFFECT. IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE
INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
z/2o/88.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
2338
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.













THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO EFFECT. IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE
INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.














THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DE_TE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. THIS MAY
EFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE
INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE THERMOSTATS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.














THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO EFFECT. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A
FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE THERMOSTATS WERE PART OF THE
VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS
FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 1 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12296X-12300X.

















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 1 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12296X-12300X.


















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 1 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12296X-12300X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 1 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12296X-12300X.


















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 1 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12296X-12300X.


















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 1 JET HEATER CONTROL3024HSWIWCRE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12296X-12300X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 2 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12301X-12305X.

















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 2 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12301X-12305X.


















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 2 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12301X-12305X.



























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 2 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12301X-12305X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2352
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 2 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12301X-12305X.


















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 2 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12301X-12305X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 3 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12306X-12310X.

















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CO_PARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




AFT MANIFOLD 3 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12306X-12310X.


















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 3 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12306X-12310X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONSf (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 3 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12306X-12310X.


















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 3 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12306X-12310X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2359
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 3 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12306X-12310X.












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANFOLD 4 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12311X-12315X.











NASA [ / ]







MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [X]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 4 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12311X-12315X.
















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 4 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12311X-12315X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /iR ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 4 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12311X-12315X.
















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AFT MANIFOLD 4 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12311X-12315X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2355
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 4 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12311X-12315X.











NASA [ / ]







MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL WITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] C ] C






AFT MANIFOLD 5 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12316X-12320X.

















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ ] *
CX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 5 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12316X-12320X.
















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 5 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12316X-12320X.













NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 5 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12316X-12320X.


















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 5 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12316X-12320X.
















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
2371
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFT MANIFOLD 5 JET HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.
SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12316X-12320X.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12003




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON IL20/88 , NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ARCS
12006
MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2090-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2092-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [- ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2092-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















[ 3/3 ] [ ]
[ 3/2R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















[3/3 ] [ 3
[3/2R] [P3
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH IOA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]

























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2156-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2156-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [p]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2177-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES.
NO EFFECT.
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2178-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D3
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS
NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE WHICH
CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2212-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2211-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2211-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2224-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2224-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS
(SOFTWARE HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE
BASED ON THIS RATIONALE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:



















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] CP] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2258-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2258-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2279-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









] [ ] [
] C ] [
] C ] C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2279-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS
(SOFTWARE HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE
BASED ON THIS RATIONALE.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257G-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS
(SOFTWARE HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE
BASED ON THIS RATIONALE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257G-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257H-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257H-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONE DIODE FAILING OPEN HAS NO EFFECT. SECOND DIODE FAILING OPEN
(THE REDUNDANCY) CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODE WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPEETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.














NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [









SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODE WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ONE DIODE FAILING OPEN HAS NO EFFECT. SECOND DIODE FAILING OPEN
(THE REDUNDANCY) CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODE WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [









SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODE WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2280-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILED MICROSWITCH CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILED MICROSWITCH CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
ARCS-12077X
05-6KA-2026-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12077




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12083
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
112o/88.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12084
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12086
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:






NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES.
EFFECT.
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES.
EFFECT.
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.











ARCS-12089X BASELINE [ ]
05-6KA-2253-2 NEW [ X ]
ARCS







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH
MANUAL COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12092
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12093
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE THUS PREVENTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] _ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12107
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTILE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12109
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH
MANUAL COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.











DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12113
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254B-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12114
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254E-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE THUS PREVENTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE AN INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
VALVE TO CLOSE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2268-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.









LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ 3 *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
__ (ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12126
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
1/1 ABORT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ix]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FME #: 05-6KA-2039-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
ARCS-12129X
05-6KA-2039-I






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [. ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.


















NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12131




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12135
ITEM: DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12136
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12137
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
/ C ] [ ] C ] C ] .[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
_ (AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/I ABORT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
1/1 ABORT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
__ (ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12155
ITEM: DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12156
ITEM: DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12157
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12158
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE _.


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOa [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261D-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT_
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2040-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2040-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36











[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]




COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2040-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2040-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2040-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36











[3/3 ] [ 3
[3/2R3 [P]




COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12177




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_/
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12178




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
. (AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.











DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE ,[ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH
MANUAL COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.











ITEM: DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ I]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12198
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12231
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]






















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
12204
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
[P] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] [N]
C x ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
_ (ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.




ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12 212 X






ITEM: DIODE - GPC CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH
MANUAL COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.











CRI TI CALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOk [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12214
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12215
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
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NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
























] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ " / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DE_TE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.














DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
_ (ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ]. [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - GPC CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH
MANUAL COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12230
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255D-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ]























DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
__ (ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.











NEW [ X ]
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - GPC CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH
MANUAL COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.





NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2255A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12245
ITEM: DIODE - GPC CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12246
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ]- [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12247
ITEM: DIODE - GPC OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(AD_DE_TE)




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















RJDAIB LI/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ I [ ] [x]
(AD_DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3/IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N 2 [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 3 [ 3 [ 3 [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3





NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
















[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
_AS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
PHEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(AD_DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COSPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(AD_DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[. / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12282
RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] CP] CP]
[ ] [ 3 [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12292
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
ARCS-12295X
05-6KA-2036-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12295




[ P ] [ P ]
[p] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]


















NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12297




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]_
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12299




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] CP]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ _]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATERCONTROLSWITCH i0




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] -[ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii









[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[p] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]










[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12




HDW/FUN C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12











[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2042-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] IX]
COXPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12318
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
D. HARTMAN
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]













NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2042-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [. ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2303-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2302-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2303-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NEW [ X ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]






(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)


























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.

















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.



















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE COVERED BY A GN&C FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:





THIS FAILURE COVERED BY A GN&C FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A MICROSWITCH FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILED OPEN DIODE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF THIS CAUSES
INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODE WAS PART OF THE HELIUM
TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS
THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3









SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODE WAS PART OF THE HELIUM
TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS
THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THIS FAILED MICROSWITCH CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING
MISSION OPERATIONS.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
_ (AD_DELETE)




THE MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE CLOSE CONTACTS WILL NOT ALLOW
THE VALVE TO BE CLOSED. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS
LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE OPEN CONTACTS PREVENTS VALVE
FROM BEING OPENED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS VALVE
FROM BEING CLOSED. THIS PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
CROSSFEED ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS VALVE
FROM BEING CLOSED. THIS PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
CROSSFEED ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A MICROSWITCH FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A MICROSWITCH FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A MICROSWITCH FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE
VALVE POSITION. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.











NEW [ x ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] CP] CP]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]











[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]












[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]











[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]












[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]







COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [. ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











IDA RECONNENOED CRITICAL ITEMS - FORt/ARD HARDWARE
NASA FMEA ASSESSMENT ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
NUMBER NUMBER









































































HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HE I SOL A & S VLVS
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY







MANIFOLD 1, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
1_6.MIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
MANIFOLD 4. GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
MANIFOLD 5, GROUNO PURGE/DRAIN COLIPLIHG
PROP TK UPPER CONPARTNENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
(_JAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
el.lAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
GINBAL BELLOWS
PROP LIMES, ALL
MANIFOLD 1, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VI.V
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD I-4 ISOLATION VALVES
PROP TK ISOL VLVS I/2 & 5/4/5
NANIPOLO [SOl. VLVS
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TK ISOL VLV 112
PROP TK ISOL VLV 5/4/5
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 112 & 31415
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
PROP TK LONER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECKOUT COUPLING
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS INTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN
INTERNAL LEAKAGE




VALVE FAILS OPEN, OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
BURST DISK FAILURE, POPPET VALVE FAILS
BURST DISK RUPTURE (LOW PRESSURE), OR LI
FAILS TO CLOSE OR LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE,LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
FALLS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
FALLS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
PRESS RELIEF VLV TEST POeT FAILS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS (REVERSE FLOW)
FAILS TO OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)











RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FALLS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY


















































JET ALIGNNENT BELLOWS, PRINARY, ALL AXES






















VI.V, PRINARY, -X AXIS
VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
VLV, PRINARY, Y AXIS
VLV, PRINARY, Z AXIS
VALVE, PRINARY, +Z AXIS
VLV, PRINARY, -X AXIS
VLV, PRINARY, Y AXIS
81PROP SOLENOID VI.V, PRINARY, Z AXIS
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE, PRINARY, ALL AXES
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
81PROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
B1PROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER CHN4BER OR NOZZLE, VERNIER, ALL AXES
HE ISOL VLV
HE ISOL VLV
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSENBLY
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSENBLY
NANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEHBLY, PRINARY
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSENBLY, PRINARY
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
HE ISOL A & 8 VLVS
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSENBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEN_LY
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSENBLY
GROUND NABUAL ISOLATION VALVE
NANIFOLD ISOI. VLVS
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRINARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRINARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
FALLS TO OPEN
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
FAILS ON, PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT




THRUSTER CHAHBEROR NOZZLE BI.JRNTNRGUGH




LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT





RELIEF DEVICE FALLS TO RELIEVE
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RURN-THRCUGH
DELAYED OPERATION, VALVE OPENS SLOWLY, LATE




BURST DISK RUPTURE (LOM PRESSURE), OR LEAKS
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
RESTRICTED FLO_f
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
D-3
APPENDIX D
/OR RECONNENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - AFT HARDWARE
NASA FHEA ASSESSNEMT ]D ITEM FAILURE RODE
NUNBER IRJNBER








































































HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOI. VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HE ISOL A & S VLVS
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSENBLY
HELIUN PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSENBLY
HELIUN PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY






NANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
NANIFOLD 3/6/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
NANIFOLD 1, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
NANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
NANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
NANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
MANIFOLD 5, GR(XIND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
PROP TK UPPER CONPARTNENT CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER CONPARTNENT CHECKOUT COUPLING
PROP TK PLEMUN SCREEN CHECKOUT COUPLING
HIGH PRESSURE HELILIN TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & S
HELIUN PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS k & S
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSENBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSENBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEHSLY
PROP LINES, ALL
CROSSFEED LINES
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TANK ISOL VI.V 112
PROP TANK ISOL V1.V 1/2
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 314/5/ A & B
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 112
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 112 & 31415
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/415
NANIFOLD [SOL VLVS
HANIFOLD 1-6 [SOL VALVES
MANIFOLD 1, ISOL VLV
NANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS INTERNALLY
INTERNAL LEAKAGE




VALVE FAILS OPEN, OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
BURST DISK FAILS, POPPET VALVE FAILS
BURST DISK RUPTURES (LOW PRESSURE), LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FALLS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FALLS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS
PRESS RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT FAILS
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS (REVERSE FLOW)
FAILS TO OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOM
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
FAILS TO OPEN
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS INTERNALLY






RELIEF DEV]CE FAILS CLOSED
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
ARCS-275 NANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV FAILS TO OPEN
===:==----===----'=----'=_----===== ==================================================
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NASA FNEA ASSESSMENT ID ITEN FAILURE MODE
NUMBER NUMBER



























































ARCS - 29 1
ARCS-292
NONE
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
NARIFOLD ISOL VLVS
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER CONPARTNENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING




JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIRANY, ALL AXES


























BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
HE ISOL VLV
HE ISOL VLV
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HELII.kq PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
RELIEF DEVICE FALLS CLOSED
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FALLS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE OR LEAK)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE PROPELLANT




THRUSTER CHAMBER OR NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH
THRUSTER CHAMBER OR NGZZLE BURNTHROUGH
FALLS TO OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOW
THRUSTER CHAMBER OR NOZZLE BURNTHROUGH
FALLS TO CLOSE








DELAYED OPERATION, VALVE OPENS SLOWLY, LATE
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKS INTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY










NASAFNEA ASSESSMENTID ITEM FAILURENODE
NUMBER NUMBER
............................... . ..... . .... o ........................................... | .........................................










































































HE CO( & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
HE (30( & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
MANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOI. VLV SWITCH 30
NANIFOLD 1, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31 •
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU [SOL VLV SWITCH 32
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU [SOL VLV SWITCH 33
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FIJ ISOL VLV SWITCH
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
RJDF1A F2 NANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
RJDFZA F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
RJDF2A F3 NANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5
RJDF1B F1NANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
RJDF1B F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
RJDF1A F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
RJDFZA F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
RJDF2A F6/F5 NANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
RJDF2A FA/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/ONS HEATERS F_ RCS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/ONS HEATERS Ft,/O RCS
SWITCH. TOGGLE RCS/ONS HEATERS FWD RCS















SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH FALLS SHORT (WORST CASE)
SMITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (I_ORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH FAIL SHORT (_RST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWTICH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FALLS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH FALLS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SWITCH FALLS OPEN (t_ORST CASE)









































































14ANIFOLD S, JETS HEATER CONTROl. SWITCH 18
NAN|FOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18















































SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SWITCH FAILS SHORT CONTACT SET















































DRiVER, HYBRID FAILS OPEN
D-7
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NkSk FNEA J ASSESSNENT ID ITEH FAILURE IqoDE
NUMBER I NUmIER
05-0KF-2214 -1 FRCS-951 DRIVER, HYBRID FAILS OPEN
FRC$-953 DRIVER, HYBRID FALLS OPEN
FRCS-956 DRIVER, HYBRID FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2220 -1 FRCS-957 DRIVER, HYBRID FAILS OPEN
05-0KF-2224 -1 FRCS-IlO34X DRIVER, HYBRID FAILS OPEN
O5-OKF-ZZS;_ -3 FRCS-11212X DIOOE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KF-225§E-2 FRCS- 577 OIODE FAILS SHORT
FRCS-599 DIODE FAILS SHORT
FRCS- (_.1 DIODE FAILS SHORT
FRCS-643 DICOE FALLS SHORT
05-OKF-2255F-2 FRCS-569 DIODE FAILS SHORT
FRCS-591 DIOOE FAILS SHORT
FRCS-613 DICOE FALLS SHORT
FRCS-635 DIODE FAILS SHORT
05-0KF-2258 -1 FRCS-11070X DIODE FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2258 -3 FRCS-I1221X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-_F-Z259 -1 FRCS-913 DIODE FALLS OPEN
FRCS-919 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-q25 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-931 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-941 DIODE FAILS OPEN
05-6KF'2259A" 1 FRCS'911 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-917 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-923 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-_'_9 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-939 DIOOE FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2260 -1 FRCS-909 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-915 DIOOE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-921 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-927 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS- 943 DIODE FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2266 -1 FRCS-11219X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GRCUND
FRCS-11220X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FRCS-933 DIODE FAILS OPEN
FRCS-935 DIODE FAILS OPEN
O'J-6KF-2;)70 -1 FRCS-11218X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FRCS-945 DIODE FAILS OPEN
05_0KF-2271 -1 FRCS-F37' DIODE FAILS OPEN
05-(_F-2302 -1 FRCS-11195X SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF2 INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WURST CASE)
NONE FRCS-1119_( SIGNAL CONOITIONER OF3 INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (IJURST CASE)
FRCS-11202X DioDE FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
FRCS-11205X NICROSWITCH ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
FRCS-II206X NICROSMITCH ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
FRCS-11213X DICOE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FRCS-II214X DIODE FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
FRCS-11215X DIODE FAILS SHCRT TO GROUND
FRCS-11216X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FRCS-11217X DI(X)E FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FRCS-1144 CHAI4BER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, FSR INDICATES LONER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
FRCS'1145 CHN4BER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, FSR FAILS ON, INDICATING HIGH PRESSURE
=1:=--.%---= =-% =-%----'= -%= =-% -%=------% ==-% ._= _ =_: _ _ =-% =----== == ==----'= _ ==----=----._.. =----P.:K .%= =----==._=----'= == == ==1-----% == =-% == =-%=--._. = ._----. == = = .%--.------=---------%=----=---=----'= _ == == = = == = = =-% .% = == = = _--= __.=:
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] NASAFHEA JASSESSNENT]D] ITEH J FAILUREHODE I
I NUHBEA] HUHBERJ ] I
J................ J............... J...................................................... I............................................. J
J HONE J FRCS-11.'_4 J OX OR FU INJECTOR TEHP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, FSR J INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL J




NASAFlEA ASSES$14BIT ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
NUMBER NUMBER







































































L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV































lOW, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
OX & FU ISOI,. VLV
GO( & FU ISOL VLV
& FU TK ISOL VLV
& FU TI( ISOL VLV
& FU TK IROL VLV
& FU TK ISOL VLV
& FU TK ISOL VLV
& FU TK ISOL VLV
LI/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L1/LS/R1 HANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LZ/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L3/R3/R5 NANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L3/R3/R5 NANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
L6/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
L6/R6 NANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
LI/RI NANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
A OR S SWITCH
A OR B SWITCH
A OR B SWITCH




3//,/5 A OR B SWITCH
3/6/5 A OR S SWITCH
3/4/5 A OR S SWITCH
I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 10
2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 10
2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 10
3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 11
3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 11
3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 11
6, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12















































SHORTS ACROSS C_TACT SET
FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)
INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FALLS SHORT (HORST CASE)
SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES
FAILS WORST (kORST CASE)
SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FALLS OPEN (WORST CASE)
INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FALLS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)










































































L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SMITCH 32, 34
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SUITCH 32, 34
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/6/5 SWITCH 33, 35
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/6/5 SWITCH 33, 35
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SMITCH 13
I_NIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SMITCH 13









































DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
SUITCH FAILS SHORT (_ORST CASE)
S_JITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET
SNITCH FALLS OPEN (WORST CASE)
SNITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET





































FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FAILS SHORT
DIODE - HANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT FAILS SHORT
D'11
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NASA FNEA ASSESSMENT ID ITEM I FAILURE MODE
NUMBER NUMBER I
.......... . ..... ....°....°o..°.. o .... . ................................................. I-°. ........ o .............................
05-6_-2254F-2 ARCS-12122X DIODE - MANUAL CLOSEfOPEN iNHIBIT FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2255E-2 ARCS-12205X DICOE - MANUAL OPENFCLOSE INHIBIT FAILS SHORT
ARCS-12221X DIOOE - NANUAL OPENfCLOSE ]NHIB[T FAILS SHORT
ARCS-12Z37X DIQOE " MANUAL OPENFCLOSE INHIBIT FAILS SHORT
ARCS-12253X DIODE - M/iJJAL OPENfCLOSE [NHIB[T FAILS SHORT
QS-6KA-2255F-2 ARCS-12207X DIODE " MANUAL CLOSEfopEN [NHIB%T FALLS SHORT
ARCS-12223X DIODE - MANUAL CLOSEfopEN INHIBIT FAILS SHORT
ARCS-12_9X DIODE - MANUAL CLOSEfOPEN INHIBIT FAILS SHORT
ARCS-12255X DIODE - MANUAL CLOSEropEN INHIBIT FALLS SHORT
05-6KA-2257-2 ARCS- 12037X DIODE FALLS SHORT
05-6KA-22STC- 1 ARCS- 120Z+4X DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1205QX DIODE FALLS OPEN
05-6_-2258-1 ARCS- 12052X DIODE FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2258-3 ARCS-12.,xI_X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KA-2259-1 ARCS- 1915 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 1923 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1927 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1935 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 1949 D IODE FAI LS OPEN
ARCS- 1955 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1961 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 1969 DIODE FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-Z259A-1 ARCS- 1917 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 19Z5 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1929 DIODE FAILS OPEN
A_- I_7 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1951 D IODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 1957 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1963 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 197'1 D lODE FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2260-1 ARCS-12._SX DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-1234_( DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-12._9X DIODE FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-IZ350X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-12353X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-1P'454X DIODE FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-1Z356X DIODE FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-12357X DIODE FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS-12_P58X DIODE FALLS SHORT TO GROUND
ARCS- 1909 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1911 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 1931 DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 19&I DIODE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 1963 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 19&5 DIODE FALLS OPEN
ARCS- 1965 DIOOE FAILS OPEN
ARCS- 197_ DIODE FALLS OPEN
05-6KA-Z261E-2 ARCS-12143_J( DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT FAILS SHORT
ARCS-12164X DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE [NHiBIT FALLS SHORT



















































































THERNOSTAT, PRIHARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
THERNOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FALLS SHOOT TO GROUND
FAILS SHOOT TO GROUND
FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
FAILS SHOOT TO GROUND

















FAILS SHOOT TO GROUND






INCORRECT OR LUSS OF OUTPUT (t,_RST CASE)
INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
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